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Moral Foundation Theory states that groups of different observers may rely on partially dissimilar
sets of moral foundations, thereby reaching different moral valuations. The use of functional imaging
techniques has revealed a spectrum of cognitive styles with respect to the differential handling of
novel or corroborating information that is correlated to political affiliation. Here we characterize
the collective behavior of an agent-based model whose inter individual interactions due to informa-
tion exchange in the form of opinions are in qualitative agreement with experimental neuroscience
data. The main conclusion derived connects the existence of diversity in the cognitive strategies
and statistics of the sets of moral foundations and suggests that this connection arises from inter-
actions between agents. Thus a simple interacting agent model, whose interactions are in accord
with empirical data on conformity and learning processes, presents statistical signatures consistent
with moral judgment patterns of conservatives and liberals as obtained by survey studies of social
psychology.
Keywords: agent-based model; opinion dynamics; reinforcement learning; statistical mechanics; neurosociol-
ogy
I. INTRODUCTION
The proponents of Moral Foundation Theory (MFT)
[35] have identified at least five moral foundations or di-
mensions that, potentially, are universally present in hu-
mans. These dimensions are manifested in different man-
ners, not only across time and cultures, but also within
a society. Individuals with different attributions of the
relative importance of the dimensions will be led to fun-
damental misunderstanding of moral motivations of each
other. Within the MFT, extensive empirical support
[30, 34, 36] has been gathered for the fact that the use of
different subsets of moral foundations by groups is signif-
icantly correlated with a scale characterizing the group
along the political spectrum. The subsets are such that
liberals tend to rely more strongly on aspects relating
to (a) harm/care and (b) fairness/reciprocity. Conserva-
tives rely on these aspects but not as much. In addition
they also regard as important (c) in-group loyalty, (d)
authority/respect and (e) purity/sanctity, to a larger ex-
tent than liberals [35].
At the scale of individuals, empirical evidence supports
∗Preprint of an article submitted for consideration
in ACS 2011 c©World Scientific Publishing Company
http://www.worldscinet.com/acs/
that: 1. moral opinions are to a large extent emitted au-
tomatically, that is, people, as a first approximation, are
intuitionists [31–34]; 2. there is a psychological cost of
dissent, with humans trying to attain social conformity
modulated by peer pressure [7, 20, 53, 55]; 3. conformity
is learned from interactions within a social network [40];
4. individual cognitive strategies may differ with respect
to the relative sensitivity to learning from novel informa-
tion as compared to reinforcing habitual responses [6].
Despite the growing body of experimental evidence ac-
cumulated over the last decade, explicit connections be-
tween this new empirical evidence on individual behav-
ior and social phenomena (or between micromotives and
macrobehavior [50]) still are relatively unexplored. Since
the work on sociophysics by Galam [24, 25], the statis-
tical mechanics community has already addressed this
aggregation problem in social systems [14, 19, 27, 28, 49,
63][65]. However, this research has mainly focused on
the study of simplified scenarios based on common sense
suppositions that result in models that are interesting
per se. Some recent works have exemplified a different
direction by postulating reasonable inter-individual in-
teractions and trying to predict [26] or explain [9] em-
pirically observed aggregate behavior. We believe that
the program of building models explicitly based on the
empirical evidence that is now available [23] is worth pur-
suing.
We do not believe that any stylized model can provide
2an all encompassing and precisely quantitative descrip-
tion of human nature. Our general goals in this work are
instead much more modest and can be stated as follows.
Our first goal is to provide a mathematical model that
is capable of connecting in the same framework empiri-
cal evidence from processes at different scales. We also
would like to have a framework that is capable of instigat-
ing the formulation of new theoretical and experimental
questions. In particular, we propose a model with agents
consistent with empirical evidence and study its aggre-
gate behavior by employing the approach and numeri-
cal techniques of statistical mechanics. We then show
that this aggregate behavior predicts that a well defined
feature is expected to be observed in the data we are
considering. We then verify the consistency of our pre-
dictions and propose a new interpretation to empirical
evidence within this framework that can be qualitatively
tested against new data sets in the future. We insist that
such a general model is only expected to provide qualita-
tive predictions of limited scope and emphasize our belief
that a good model should make testable predictions but
should not explain too much.
In the following sections we give details on the empir-
ical evidence we consider relevant, introduce our model-
ing approach, present and discuss the results obtained.
A brief summary of methods employed is provided as an
appendix.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE MODEL
In building our model we have tried to incorporate in
a stylized manner empirical evidence. In this section we
describe what we believe to be essential empirical obser-
vations and which model structures they suggest.
A. Moral theories and the automaticity of moral
judgments
Philosophers have struggled with the problem of con-
ceptualizing morality since antiquity. Although philo-
sophical theories tend to be of normative character they
can be regarded as a starting point in considering a pos-
sible scientific approach for morality as a social phe-
nomenon. Three theories are of particular interest to our
discussion: virtue theory, deontology and utilitarianism
[11, 37].
According to [13, 37], utilitarianism proposes that
moral judgments should be based on the consequences
resulting from them. Only actions that maximize so-
cial happiness and minimize pain should be taken. In
the deontological view only actions that could be univer-
sally adopted without violating anyone’s rights should be
pursued. Virtue theory takes into account the intrinsic
limitations of human nature and states that morality is
concerned with maximizing virtues and minimizing vices.
Each view of morality presupposes cognitive loads that
can be experimentally verified. While utilitarianism and
deontology concentrate moral decisions on higher cog-
nitive functions in the prefrontal and sensorial brain re-
gions, virtue theory proposes the coordinated functioning
of these areas with others associated to the processing of
emotions. Data gathered in the last decade favors a com-
bination of the three views with preponderance of a mode
that is closer to virtue theory [33, 41]. Actually ample
research points in the direction that moral opinions are
mostly formed with very few recourse to utilitarian (or
consequentialist) reasoning.
Evidence supports that moral violations elicit strong
negative responses that activate the socio-emotional
structures of the brain (e.g. medial prefrontal cortex and
posterior cingulate cortex)[66]. But emotions are not the
only component behind every moral judgment as exper-
imental observation also suggests that these automatic
negative responses can be overcome by a more utilitarian
mode by recruiting cognitive areas in the prefrontal cor-
tex, in particular, when difficult personal dilemmas with
important social consequences are involved [32, 41, 47].
In this work we simplify by only considering the moral
grading of statements and not the comparison and sub-
sequent choice between different possibilities and their
consequences. Therefore we keep from entering a discus-
sion between deontological or consequentialist [11] moral
theories which might guide the modeling of decisions and
choices associated to moral dilemmas. We start by sup-
posing as a first approximation that socio-emotional in-
tuitions predominate and that moral grading is in fact
automatic.
B. Moral foundations
Human culture and values are markedly diverse. Nev-
ertheless, this diversity seems to emerge from innate uni-
versals. Modern research in cultural anthropology [54],
primatology [18] and evolutionary psychology [35, 39]
suggests that morality may be parsed into a small num-
ber of basic intuitions. Haidt and collaborators [30, 35–
37] reviewed the literature to identify five candidates to
innate moral intuitions (or foundations) associated to:
care, fairness (classified as individualizing foundations),
loyalty, authority and purity (binding foundations). This
set of innate moral foundations could have coevolved
with culture due to adaptive challenges primate popu-
lations have been subjected to in their evolutionary his-
tory [10, 35]. This innateness, however, does not imply
moral judgments that are rigid or genetically determined.
What is considered to be a virtue or a vice in a given so-
ciety at a given time depends instead on learning and
imitation in a social environment. This plasticity from
an initial draft is the key to understand how diversity
can be universality-bound [30, 43]. In our model we in-
troduce moral foundations as dimensions in an abstract
moral state space (for a similar suggestion see [16]). Five
dimensional moral vectors live in this space and are an-
3imated by an adaptation dynamics elicited by social in-
teractions.
C. Reinforcement Learning
Extensive literature (see [38] and references therein)
suggests the existence of a generic machinery for error
and conflict processing in humans. This adaptive circuit
implements a full-fledged reinforcement learning system.
In this system the basal ganglia processes error infor-
mation provided by the spinal cord, the sensorial cortex
and by areas that were traditionally labeled as the lim-
bic system. This error measure is then converted into a
dopamine signal that is used to correct responses with
the mediation of a strategically connected region known
as the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC).
In event related potential (ERP) experiments the pro-
cessing of social exclusion feelings and social normative
conflicts has been associated to error related negativity
(ERN) signals with source located in the ACC. This lo-
calization has been further confirmed by fMRI [38]. Ini-
tial activation of the ACC due to conflict has also been
associated to subsequent alignment to opinions perceived
as preponderant in the social group [40]. These new data
corroborate classical behavioral experiments on the psy-
chology of conformity conducted by Sherif [53] and Asch
[7]. Such findings suggest a central role to reinforcement
learning in the dynamics of conformity to social norms.
The observation of amigdala activation during social con-
flict [8] together with the known association of the ACC
activation when physical pain is involved [20, 55] addi-
tionally suggest that disagreement elicits a psychological
cost in humans.
Both the automaticity of moral judgments and the psy-
chological cost of disagreement can be represented by us-
ing a reinforcement learning model that is well estab-
lished in computer science [57] and statistical mechanics
[21]. Within this model a moral judgment is regarded as
a classification task. Each agent has an internal moral
state Ji. At each time step an agent is chosen and its
internal state is updated to minimize the psychological
cost. If there is no noise in the communication, this min-
imization follows a gradient descent dynamics:
J˜i(t+ 1) = Ji(t)− ǫ∇Ji(t)H,
Ji(t+ 1) =
J˜i(t+ 1)
|J˜i(t+ 1)|
(1)
where ǫ defines the time scale and H represents the social
cost, namely, the sum of psychological costs incurred by
an agent in a given social network.
D. Cognitive styles
A recent experiment [6] has shown evidence that there
is a correlation between being a liberal or conservative
with respect to social issues and the way novel or cor-
roborating information is used. The experimental setup
consists of the measurement of ERPs and concomitant
fMRI while participants are exposed to a Go/No-Go task.
The subjects first habituate to a frequent “Go” stimulus.
In some rare occasions a “No-Go” stimulus appears and
a related ERN signal is registered. As expected, a lo-
calization algorithm and simultaneous fMRI identify the
ACC as a source for the conflict signal. Before the exper-
imental section, the participants are asked to rate their
political orientation from −5 for “very liberals” to +5
for “very conservatives”. A negative correlation is then
found between political affiliation and the amplitude of
the ERN signal. Liberals exhibit more intense conflict re-
lated activation of the ACC as compared to habituated
response.
Two other recent studies provide further evidence by
associating political behavior and genetic differences af-
fecting dopamine receptors known as DRD2 and DRD4
[17, 52]. Dopamine is a neurotransmitter directly related,
among several other things, to predictive reward systems
that modulate reinforcement learning mechanisms [51].
We regard these experiments as suggesting that self-
declared liberals are more at ease with novel informa-
tion and rely less on corroborating information while self-
declared conservatives prefer corroboration and are less
at ease with novelty. We use the term corroboration to
signify “confirming and in accordance to previous opin-
ion”. This new empirical work concurs with ample liter-
ature in social sciences which have discussed for decades
the relation between cognitive styles and political orien-
tation [2]. Whether this cognitive diversity is due to ge-
netic or cultural conditions is beyond our present scope.
We try to capture some aspect of the information con-
veyed by this class of empirical results by recurring to
models of statistical learning [21]. We propose that there
are different learning styles according to the balance be-
tween novelty seeking and corroboration. For that we
introduce a parameter 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 that specifies the am-
plitude ratio between learning corroborating and learning
conflicting information and define a learning algorithm
interpolating between pure corroboration learning when
δ = 1 and pure novelty seeking learning when δ = 0. In
one social interaction we would then have:
J˜i(t+ 1) = Ji(t) + ǫF (hi, hj)x (2)
Ji(t+ 1) =
J˜i(t+ 1)
| J˜i(t+ 1) |
,
where the function
F (hi, hj) =
{
δhj if hihj > 0
hj otherwise
, (3)
modulates learning of agent i by comparing its classifica-
tion hi = Ji ·x of an input x with that issued by a social
neighbor hj . The response of agent i is then corrected
with direction given by the issue and sign and amplitude
dictated by the information provided by agent j.
4E. Social influence
Classical experimental setups by Sherif [53] and Asch
[7] demonstrated that groups influence individual beliefs
and decisions. In Sherif’s experiment subjects are placed
in a dark room and asked to judge the displacement of
a spot of light without knowing that it is actually sta-
tionary. The task is repeated a number of rounds with
participants either alone or in groups. When in group,
individual estimates converge to a group specific norm.
In Asch’s experiment a participant is placed in a room
with a group of other people that are, without her knowl-
edge, confederates of the study. She is then presented
with two cards. One with a standard vertical line and
the other with one vertical line the same length of the
standard and two with different lengths. The participant
is then asked to identify which of the lines in the second
card is most similar to the standard line in the first card,
but this is done after all confederates unanimously make
the wrong choice. A strong conformist trend is observed,
with decreased accuracy of individual judgment.
These experiments are generically consistent with the
modern picture of conflict mediated reinforcement learn-
ing [40]. However, two aspects of these setups require
a closer examination: in the first setup participants are
anonymous and information ambiguous and in the sec-
ond information is comparatively objective and subjects
largely uncategorized.
Modern social psychology defines three types of social
influence [1]: informational, normative and referent in-
formational. Informational influence is the predominant
mechanism for social influence in the absence of objective
evidence and when no group identification is present as
in Sherif’s experiment. The expectation of acceptance or
punishment by other members in a group leads to nor-
mative influence observed in Asch’s experiment. When
group membership is salient referent informational influ-
ence becomes dominant. In this mode individuals seek
to be identified as pertaining to a given group.
To investigate referent informational influence in [1]
Sherif’s and Asch’s experiments are repeated with the
introduction of salient group membership. It is observed
that if a participant regards herself as part of a different
group, the conformity effect is greatly diminished.
In our modeling effort we then suppose that referent
informational influence is preponderant and, as a starting
point, assume the extreme scenario where only in-group
conflict leads to conformity effects. We therefore start by
considering the case in which agents are circumscribed to
social neighborhoods with homogeneous cognitive styles
represented by the corroboration/novelty parameter δ.
F. Social topology
Social networks have received a great deal of atten-
tion during the last decade [5]. The Internet and social
networking sites like Facebook, MySpace or Orkut now
make possible to study empirically topological and dy-
namical properties of social graphs. One of the simplest
topological properties that can be defined is the distribu-
tion of node degrees P (k). A growing number of studies
seems to indicate that many natural networks are well
represented by scale-free graphs with the tail of the node
distribution given by P (k) ∼ k−γ [5].
To make an informed modeling choice we have searched
the literature for networks representing social interac-
tions. We have found some illustrative cases. For in-
stance, the node distribution of a network of phone calls
has been found to be scale-free with γ = 2.1 in [4]. The
network of sexual contacts has been identified as being
scale-free with γ = 3.4 in [42]. By employing a sampling
algorithm a power law with γ = 3.4 has been reported for
the Facebook [29], but this estimate relies on a range of
degrees spanning only one decade. Other study of entire
networks instead supports an exponential node distribu-
tion in this case [58]. A third study [3] with samples
from three social network websites reports scale-free be-
havior with γ = 2, γ = 3.1 and γ = 3.7, respectively for
Cyworld, MySpace and Orkut.
We have considered empirical evidence and have ap-
plied the simple procedure of preferential attachment de-
scribed by Baraba´si and Albert [5] to generate scale-free
social networks with γ = 3. We are aware of the fact that
clustering properties of networks built in such way will
differ from those found in real social networks, however,
we have been able to verify that the particular results
we present here are sensitive to the degree distribution
and qualitatively robust in relation to other topological
properties [61].
III. AGENT-BASED MODEL
A. Combining empirical ingredients
We introduce a model for an interacting society where
agents represent individuals that debate moral issues
with their social neighbors. In general terms our mod-
eling approach continues a now established line of re-
search on opinion dynamics [14, 27, 60]. We however,
strongly emphasize that information exchanges and pro-
cessing, even though stylized, should be explicitly linked
to the empirical evidence available.
We start by supposing that the moral state space has
MD = 5 dimensions so that moral issues may be parsed
into these dimensions. We simplify by assuming only unit
vectors. It is certainly possible that the same results we
have reached could have been obtained by assuming less
(or more) dimensions, however, it would be incompatible
with known empirical data that supports the existence
of five moral dimensions [34–36].
We consider that an agent i attributes a moral content
for an issue µ that may then be represented by a five
component unit vector (issue vector) [60] xiµ = xµ+uiµ
with µ = 1, ..., P and i = 1, · · · , N . Here xµ represents
5the average part of the moral parsing and uiµ represents
an individual part.
We call the average (normalized) issue Z ∝∑N
i=1
∑P
µ=1 xiµ the Zeitgeist vector, which can be re-
garded as describing the cultural environment and pro-
viding a symmetry breaking direction in the moral state
space. Here we are not to be concerned with the origin
of the Zeitgeist[67] vector as it results from evolutionary
and historical processes taking place in time scales that
exceed the scope of our simple model. We further sim-
plify the model by assuming that individual components
are such that
∑N
i=1
∑P
µ=1 uiµ = 0 and are small enough
so that they can be disregarded in a first analysis. We
are also going to assume that the individual components
are not correlated over the social network.
The relevant variables to characterize an agent are sug-
gested by moral foundation theory. For each agent and
unavailable to other agents, the internal moral state is
encoded in another unit vector Ji (moral vector), also
five dimensional, the magnitude of each component rep-
resenting the weight the i-th agent gives to a particular
moral foundation. Unit vectors are used to avoid intro-
ducing the collateral notion that one agent could be more
moral than another.
The automaticity of moral judgment is then repre-
sented as a classification task where in an elementary
interaction an agent i gathers information on the moral
classification of her social neighbor j on a given issue
µ. This classification is represented by a field given by
hjµ = Jj ·xjµ. Its attributes are its sign and magnitude,
indicating respectively whether the issue is considered
morally acceptable (hiµ > 0) or not (hiµ < 0) and how
strongly the agent holds this position (|hiµ|).
At this point we make an additional abstraction leap
that leads to a still simpler model: we suppose that a
debate is a more complex interaction that involves mul-
tiple issues and multiple agents and it works effectively
as if the participants were estimating the Zeitgeist vector
Z. Therefore, the effective interaction we are going to
consider corresponds to the exchange of fields hj = Jj ·Z
between neighbors.
We only consider here social influence between similar
cognitive styles, namely, agents have homogeneous cog-
nitive styles and interactions are symmetric. To consider
the empirical fact that in-group disagreement (or being in
the minority) elicits a negative brain response we intro-
duce a measure of the psychological cost of disagreement
between socially interacting agents i and j. It is quan-
tified by Vδ(hi, hj), a function of their opinions which
depends on a parameter δ that measures the different
treatment of corroborating or novel opinions.
Reinforcement learning can be recast in its off-line ver-
sion [21] as the process of seeking a minimum in a given
cost landscape. Along this line we assume that moral
vectors Ji evolve by decreasing the psychological cost un-
der communication through a noisy channel. The social
cost H is defined by summing Vδ over all pairs (i, j) of
interacting agents:
H({Ji}) =
∑
(i,j)
Vδ(hi, hj). (4)
It depends on {Ji}, the configuration of the society, and
on the cultural environment, given by the Zeitgeist vec-
tor.
FIG. 1: Psychological cost: Vδ(hj(θj), hk(θk)) as a func-
tion of θj and θk, the angles between Jj , Jk and the Zeit-
geist vector Z where hj = cos θj . The potential can be
written as Vδ(hj , hk) = −hjhk if hjhk < 0 (disagreement)
and Vδ(hj , hk) = δhjhk if hjhk > 0 (agreement). The
figure depicts cases with δ = 0(left), δ = 0.4(center) and
δ = 1.0(right). The noisy learning dynamics tends to change
the J making Vδ decrease along its gradient. Four peaks rep-
resent the cost of maximum disagreement when moral state
vectors are opposite and angles are (0,±pi) and (±pi, 0). Note
that when agents agree about the sign of their opinions, the
benefit of agreement increases with δ.
The functional form of the psychological cost must re-
flect experimental data. The only stylized fact we include
is that there are different cognitive styles regarding the
different way that novelty and corroborating data is han-
dled. By integrating the modulation function proposed
in equation 3 we reach a reasonable choice, by no means
unique, that is depicted in figure 1:
Vδ(hi, hj) =
1
2
(1− δ)|hihj |−1
2
(1 + δ)hihj . (5)
The corroboration/novelty parameter δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1)
quantifies a cognitive strategy with respect to the dif-
ference in treatment of agreement and disagreement as
it is suggested by ERP experiments. Our agents are
conformists, namely, in the face of disagreeing opinions,
the dynamics is such that the social cost is decreased.
For δ = 0 (leftmost panel of figure 1) agents are nov-
elty seekers and do not use corroborating opinions since
Vδ=0(hj , hk) is flat for opinions of the same sign. For
δ = 1 (rightmost panel of figure 1) agents seek corrob-
oration and conformity, learning equally in the case of
agreement or disagreement.
The techniques of statistical mechanics permit obtain-
ing collective or aggregate emergent phenomena arising
from reinforcement learning with the value of the social
cost H or at least, its average, constituting relevant in-
formation to characterize the state of the society with
respect to the current Zeitgeist.
6B. Incomplete information, statistical mechanics
and peer pressure
The incompleteness of the available information about
agent moral vectors imposes the use of probabilities in
describing the moral state of the society. What is the
information available to construct the theory? From the
evidence about cognitive styles of persons we have con-
structed two functions. First, the psychological cost,
equation 5, which describes the cost of disagreeing as
a function of the opinions of the agents. Second, the so-
cial cost, equation 4, is the sum over pairs of interacting
agents of the psychological cost. The social cost is about
the whole society and results obtained from it will include
collective properties arising from the interaction among
the agents. It carries two types of information, about the
internal space of pair interactions or cognitive level and
about the external space, specifically about the geometry
of the neighborhood of interactions, or the social level.
A complex system such as a society can be described in
many ways. Suppose that we choose to study experimen-
tal questions which will have the same answer when the
social cost has a given value or a given expected value, av-
eraged over the probability distribution. There might be
questions that do not fall into this category. In a physics
language, an experimentalist wishes to prepare a system,
by deciding on the control of certain parameters, in such
a way that repetitions of the experiment will result in
compatible answers for a class of questions. There will
be other questions that, not resulting in predictable an-
swers, can’t be addressed within that experimental setup.
This might be because, at last they are not interesting,
or that another experimental design is needed in order
to examine them. We concentrate on those questions for
which knowing the expected value of the social cost is suf-
ficient. If this cost is not known, then the most tempting
thing to do is, by claiming insufficient reason to pick one
direction over other, is to assign a uniform distribution
for the set of moral vectors. Now, upon learning that
the social cost of the society is an important quantity
that defines the state, we suppose it known. This sim-
ple assumption leads to the introduction of a conjugate
variable, the peer pressure scale. Knowledge of one per-
mits calculating the other, although this might be very
difficult to do. At any rate, if we ignore both, for a
given experimental system, the theory requires that one
of them be measured. This is how it goes. We start
from a uniform distribution P0({Ji}). Suppose that new
information is obtained, now the expected value of H is
known. This is the average with respect to an unknown
distribution PB({Ji}), which we have to find. What-
ever was codified into the prior distribution, it was for
a reason. The new distribution will have to include the
new information and in some sense, from all those that
do, will have to “lie closer” to the prior. Closer means,
effectively, that the fewest unwarranted new hypotheses
must be introduced. The method to do this exists, and
has its roots in Boltzmann, Gibbs, Shannon and Jaynes.
See [15] for a modern exposition and justification of the
Maximum Entropy method.
The resulting method consists of maximizing the cross
entropy between the prior and the posterior distributions,
subject to the constraints imposed by the new informa-
tion and normalization. The constraints are included via
the usual method of Lagrange multipliers:
S [PB ||P0] = −
∫ ∏
i
dµ(Ji)PB ln
PB
P0
+ α
(
E −
∫ ∏
i
dµ(Ji)HPB
)
+ λ
(
1−
∫ ∏
i
dµ(Ji)PB
)
, (6)
with dµ(Ji) being the uniform measure on the surface of
a sphere in MD = 5 dimensions.
It follows that the probability of configuration {Ji} is
the Boltzmann distribution
P({Ji}) ∝ exp [−αH({Ji})] . (7)
The Lagrange multiplier α is still free and has to be
chosen to impose that the average value of H is E. The
informational content of E and α is, therefore, the same.
Expected values of quantities of interest can be calcu-
lated for different values of α and of any parameters that
enter in H, such as δ. We name the new parameter α
the peer pressure, since it sets the scale of the effect of
social cost, and measures the inverse level of noise in the
communication channel.
IV. DATA ON MORAL FOUNDATIONS
Data consisted of five dimensional score vectors with
components in the interval [0, 5] representing the rele-
vance attributed to each moral foundation. Each vector
was also labeled by the subject’s self-declared political
affiliation from p.a.= 1 (very liberal) to p.a.=7 (very
conservative)[30, 36].
Scores were extracted from Moral Foundations Ques-
tionnaires (MFQ30)[68] taken by N = 14250 US citizens.
These questionnaires combine Studies 1 and 2 reported
in [30] and are composed by two parts each with 15 sen-
tences (3 for each foundation) plus one verification sen-
tence.
In the first part subjects are asked the question:
7“When you decide whether something is right or wrong,
to what extent are the following considerations relevant to
your thinking?”. Answers are given by scaling sentences
of moral content from “not at all relevant” (score= 0) to
“extremely relevant” (score= 5). In the second part sub-
jects scale sentences of a moral content from “strongly
disagree”(score= 0) to “strongly agree” (score= 5). A
moral vector component is then the average of 6 scores
corresponding to a particular moral foundation. Moral
vectors Ji are obtained by normalizing score vectors.
FIG. 2: The transition line separates phases with zero (be-
low the line) and non zero average overlap with the Z vector
(〈mZi〉 > 0). The phase transition is continuous. Symbols
represent average and dispersion for 20 simulation runs of
a N = 400 system with scale-free Baraba´si-Albert topolo-
gies. The full line represents a fit to the transition border line
α = k/δ, with k constant. This can be seen more clearly in
the inset. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals for
a regression.
V. RESULTS
We describe the aggregate behavior of the model and
compare it to the aggregate behavior extracted from
MFQ30 questionnaires. By introducing appropriate or-
der parameters we can compare both systems, the set of
subjects and the agents, in a semantic free manner. The
correlation of political affiliation and different cognitive
styles is established by first showing that different cog-
nitive styles are associated to different distributions of
moral values in the agent model and noticing that differ-
ent sets of moral values are associated to different polit-
ical affiliations in the MFQ30 data. A group of socially
interacting members with a diversity of cognitive styles
will therefore present a political spectrum. Groups of
conservative agents show larger in-group coherence while
groups of liberal agents adapt faster to changes in the
issues under discussion.
FIG. 3: Histograms for the effective dimensionmZi for p.a.=1
to 7. Histograms for simulations at α = 8 and different values
of δ are depicted as dashed lines for comparison. Simulations
have been performed with a scale-free social network of size
N = 400. Results are qualitatively robust to changes in the
lattice topology and system size.
We now discuss the statistical signatures that can be
used to characterize the effective number of moral foun-
dations of an agent. We compare them with equivalent
signatures derived from the MFQ30 data.
Our main concern is the difference in the distribution of
weights attributed to moral foundations by self-declared
liberals and conservatives. Numerical simulation tech-
niques, briefly discussed in the appendix, show that the
model can have two qualitatively different regimes de-
pending on the parameters δ and α (figure 2). For low
δ and low α, the system is in a disordered state charac-
terized by random correlations between the moral state
vectors of the agents. Increasing either δ or α, a transi-
tion line can be crossed into a partially ordered society.
Now the agents are correlated to a symmetry breaking di-
rection Z, the Zeitgeist vector, which can be regarded as
describing the cultural environment. The average agent
is parallel to Z. Now we reorient Z, by rotating the frame
of reference, so that its components are equal (e.g. 1/
√
5
each), explicitly assuming the equivalence of all moral di-
mensions. Note that opinions are rotation invariant and
rotating makes no numerical difference. But it does foster
interpretation, since a measure of the effective number of
moral foundations of agent i can be defined as propor-
tional to the sum over the moral dimensions a, of the
agents moral weights:
mZi =
5∑
a=1
JiaZa, (8)
the overlap between the moral vector and Z, ranging from
−1 to 1. An agent with all moral dimensions equally
important has mZi = 1. Smaller values mean it relies on
8a reduced subset of moral dimensions. From the survey
data, we extract, for each person a similar measure mZi
of their number of moral dimensions.
FIG. 4: By matching the mean average dimension, the rela-
tionship between the cognitive strategy parameter δ and the
political affiliation is identified for α = 6 to 12. The dashed
line represents the case depicted in figure 3. Simulations were
performed with a scale-free social network of size N = 400.
Results are qualitatively robust to changes in the lattice topol-
ogy and system size.
Our aim is to compare the statistics of mZi from the
data and from the model. Figure 3 compares histograms
of mZi as obtained from the data and as generated by
the model, for α = 8 on a scale-free social network. We
have done several studies including different versions of
the model. The conclusions we present, as far as the
temptation of detailed quantitative confrontation with
the data is tamed, are independent of the different vari-
ants of the model. We have only considered symmetric
and homogeneous interactions which allows for the use of
a single δ throughout the social network. In all simula-
tions presented in this paper the social neighborhood was
represented by a scale-free random graph generated by a
Baraba´si-Albert model [45] with branching rate m = 8.
We have also simulated a society subscribed to a two
dimensional square lattice with nearest neighbor inter-
actions. While this neighborhood seems too artificial,
the results were qualitatively similar to those reported in
this paper. Results within scale-free topologies, however,
show the best agreement with data as far as overlap mZi
histograms depicted in figure 3a are concerned.
Agents have no political affiliation and persons do not
declare their cognitive strategy δ. However, histograms
permit identifying a political affiliation with a cognitive
strategy. Figure 4 was prepared by calculating 〈mZi〉 for
each p.a. class of the data and then finding, for each
given fixed α, the parameter δ that matches 〈mZi〉 (20
Metropolis runs, α = 6−12). Figure 4 also shows that the
connection between the corroboration/novelty parameter
δ and political affiliation is qualitatively robust for a rea-
sonably wide range of α.
VI. DISCUSSION
The observations of the last section permit establish-
ing the following link: political affiliations are partially
derived from subsets of moral foundations, which arise
collectively from distinct cognitive strategies. We con-
clude that the link described in the literature connecting
political affiliation to cognitive style [30, 35] arises as a
consequence of social interactions.
As the order-disorder border line (figure 2) is ap-
proached from the ordered phase, the overlap with Z
decreases, vanishing at the phase boundary. The best
resemblance of the data and simulations occurs by identi-
fying conservatives with agents far into the ordered phase
and liberals with agents near the transition line but still
in the ordered phase. Order and disorder refer to long
range correlations and should not be attached to judg-
ments of value.
We can go beyond the average number of moral foun-
dations and make a prediction, based on the behavior
of the agent model, about the width of the histograms.
They decrease with increasing δ and the data shows that
they decrease also with conservative tendency. The same
identification: novelty seeking behavior to liberals, cor-
roboration to conservatives, is again seen to arise as a
consequence of collective behavior.
Order-disorder transitions can be driven by chang-
ing the peer pressure. Even without crossing the phase
boundary, the model can be used to understand collective
swings from left to right, as external conditions impose
increased levels of peer pressure arising from the percep-
tion of threats. The reverse swing can also be understood
when conditions demand higher adaptability to new chal-
lenges. We claim that with respect to moral issues, de-
spite the differences in opinion derived from differential
reliance on moral foundations, both conservatives and
liberals are on the same side of the border. Other sce-
narios are discernible from the phase diagram. In an
application outside the realm of morality, by looking at
opinions on issues for which peer pressure might be lower,
a group of large δ agents, relying on corroboration, could
be found in a disordered phase and seem on this set of
issues, to be liberal.
This theory is semantically neutral. Evolutionary con-
siderations should be used to dress the theory with se-
mantics and to understand why certain foundations of
morality have emerged before others and why they are
different, thus breaking the remaining symmetry between
the five dimensions. Our model cannot claim to shed light
on the different nature of the different moral foundations.
It just states that based on differential treatment of novel
and corroborating information, on conformity seeking be-
9havior and on social interactions, populations will present
collective statistically different moral valuations in a way
that can be quantitatively described.
We believe that this work may create a number of op-
portunities for future research. Firstly it is highly desir-
able to test the model against new data sets. To give
three illustrative examples: 1. in [52] a connection is
made between the structure of social networks during
adolescence and political preferences in adulthood; 2. in
[59] it is found that the opinion of a typical member of
a virtual social network is influenced by about 20% of
their neighbors; 3. [56] makes an empirical analysis of
the voting patterns of US federal judge panels finding
correlations between the political affiliation of the ma-
jority and the decisions reached. Our view is that the
model we have proposed might have something to say
about what sort of patterns are expected to be seen in
each one of these examples.
We suggest that a social cost can be defined and that
its mean value is directly associated to a parameter α
we have identified as the “peer pressure”. We regard the
measurement of peer pressure as a relevant open problem
suggested by our modeling effort. Finally, the model also
has some consequences that could be empirically verified,
for example: 1. peer pressure acts as a control parame-
ter that if increased can transform a group regarded as
liberal into a conservative group. The reverse also being
true; 2. a liberal group would adapt to changes in the
environment faster than a conservative group but would
not reach consensus easily.
We consider, however, as the most important contribu-
tion of this work to emphasize a particular methodolog-
ical approach to the social sciences. From the descrip-
tion of how individuals react to incoming information
obtained from social psychology empirical methods and
neurocognitive data, we built an interacting model. Sta-
tistical mechanics leads to aggregated predictions which
are tested against extensive data sets with partial in-
formation about populations. The exchange of informa-
tion and the learning it elicits, induce collective emergent
properties in the society not to be found in the individual.
Presumably it may be useful to understand how cultural
divides, such as those between conservatives and liberals,
arise partly as consequences of diversity of neurocognitive
mechanisms.
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Appendix A: Methods summary
1. Metropolis sampling
We assume that the model society is represented at
micro-scales by continuous opinions hj and that the sys-
tem statistics can be described at intermediary time
scales by a Boltzmann distribution:
P ({Jj} | Z) = 1Z(α, δ) exp

−α∑
(i,j)
Vδ(hi, hj)

 (A1)
with (i, j) being edges of a social graph and Vδ(hi, hj) is
the psychological cost given by (5). The statistics for the
overlaps mZi =
∑Md
a=1 JiaZa, depicted in figure 3a, can
be obtained by sampling from (A1). This has been done
by employing a classical Metropolis sampling technique
[46]. The C code employed is provided as an ancillary
file to this document.
We choose a random Zeitgeist vector Z. The distri-
bution (A1) is symmetric in relation to sign changes
Za → −Za in the components of this vector. To deal
with this degeneracy all simulations are started with
moral vectors Jj aligned to the direction Z. More re-
alistic information exchange dynamics to be published
elsewhere shows that the system auto-organizes into the
same macrostates obtained by this simplified procedure.
2. Wang-Landau algorithm
While Metropolis-like algorithms sample from the dis-
tribution and collect data at a single point in the phase
diagram, there is another class of algorithms which per-
mit collecting information that will allow to obtain re-
sults for a set of parameter values. The Wang-Landau
algorithm [62], belongs to this second class. The main
theme is to collect information about the density of
states, which in this case is peer pressure (α) indepen-
dent and then to propagate to different values of α, by
re-weighting via the Boltzmann factor. This is done for a
particular value of the novelty/corroboration parameter
δ. The density depends on δ and so this procedure has to
be repeated for a set of δ values. The C code employed
is provided as an ancillary file to this document.
The transition line in figure 2 was obtained by Wang-
Landau sampling of a system with HamiltonianH at tem-
perature 1/α by finding numerically the maximum of the
specific heat for fixed δ.
3. Empirical histograms
Data consisted of N = 14250 moral vectors with com-
ponents related to five Moral Foundations in the inter-
val [0, 5] extracted from a specially designed the MFQ30
questionnaire[30]. Each vector was labeled by the sub-
ject’s self-declared political affiliation (from p.a. = 1 to
7). We first calculated normalized moral vectors Ji and,
by defining the vector Z as the average vector within the
conservative (p.a.= 6) and very conservative (p.a.= 7)
classes, we have calculated histograms for the effective
number of moral dimensions mZi =
∑Md
a=1 JiaZa (de-
picted in figure 3a).
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p.a. score n 〈mz〉 µ1/2(mz) σz p.a. label
1 2919 0.825(5) 0.837(4) 0.084(2) very liberal
2 5604 0.877(2) 0.889(2) 0.069(2) liberal
3 2009 0.907(3) 0.920(3) 0.063(4) slightly liberal
4 1448 0.932(3) 0.947(3) 0.056(4) moderate
5 879 0.964(2) 0.975(2) 0.035(3) slightly conservative
6 1087 0.979(2) 0.986(1) 0.026(4) conservative
7 300 0.976(4) 0.987(2) 0.040(10) very conservative
6+7 1387 0.979(2) 0.987(1) 0.028(4) conservative
aError bars represent 95% symmetrized bootstrap confidence in-
tervals.
b
µ1/2(mz) denotes the median of the overlaps mz .
cWe consider the classes “conservative” and “very conservative”
together as their statistical moments, shown in the table above, are
indistinguishable.
